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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN \V. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
GLEN MAUCHLEY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 7203 
Lf-.4 ~ r -:--"'\ .. ~~1 __ . D Jl' ·-~.. >. /, ~ 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NEWELL G. DAINES 
L. DELOS DAINES, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial Dis-
trict of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN W .. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
GLEN :\IAUCHLEY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
\ 
Case No. 7203 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial Dis-
trict, in and for Cache Countv, State of Utah . 
.I 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from a judgment of the Honor-
able :\Iariner :\L :\Iarrison, District Judge, whereby and 
wherein on the 5th day of ~1arch, 1948, he directed aver-
dict in favor of the defendant, no cause for action, and 
entering judgment thereon in favor of the defendant, and 
thereafter, on the 22nd day of :March, 1948, on proper ap-
plication refused to grant plaintiff a new trial. ( Tr. 33, 
35, 36, 41, 58, 172, 173. 
PLEADINGS 
The plaintiff set forth that on the 9th day of January, 
1947, the defendant carelessly and negligently backed a 
school bns front a private driveway into a public street; 
that the same was caused to collide with plaintiff's aut-
omobile which he was driving; that he was negligent in 
failing to keep a proper lookout for vehicle travelling on 
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the highway and particularly the vehicle of the plaintiff; 
that he failed and admitted to have control of the school 
bus; that he failed and admitted to yield the right-of-way 
to plaintiff; that he backed the school bus into the high-
way without giving a signal or warning of his intention to 
do so; that the plaintiff's automobile was damaged and he 
sustained personal injuries. Damages in the sum of $8, 
331.26 were asked. ( Tr.4,6) . 
.-\ __ NSWER 
The answer admits all the allegations of the com-
plaint except the damages and the negligence charged. 
Defendant alleged contributary negligence of the plain-
tiff setting forth that he was negligent driving 35 miles 
an hour knowing the road was icy and slippery; that he 
failed to keep a proper lookout for vehicles entering the 
road; that knowing the road was icy and slippery, he ap-
plied his brakes causing his automobile to skid across the 
road striking the school bus; that plaintiff did not have 
his automobile under control in that after observing the 
scholl bus he failed to reduce his speed so as to pass the 
bus without having to apply his brakes in an attempt to 
reduce the speed thereof. ( Tr. 12, 13). 
Upon the issues thus framed, a trial was had before 
the Honorable Mariner M. Morrison sitting with a jury 
on the 5th day of ~1arch, 1948. 
THE EVIDENCE 
The public road on which the collision occurred is 
oiled and hard surfaced extending in a easterly and west-
erly direction in Cache County, Utah, known as the Col-
lege Ward-:Millville Road. The thoroughfare is about 
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85 feet wide from fence to fence; hard oiled surface, 16 
feet wide; the shoulders on each side, 6 feet wide from the 
north shoulder to the north fence is about 24 feet and 
from the south shoulder to the south fence is about 33 
feet. ( Tr. -t 13, 60, 61, 88.) It intersects with Highway 
91, also known as the Logan-Hyrum Road, at a point 
about four miles south of Logan, Utah, at which point it 
terminates. Tr. 4, 13, 64.) 
The collision complained of took place on the College 
"Yard-Millville Road at a point about 443 feet West of the 
intersection and out from the private driveway of the de-
fendant. The driveway nms in a northerly and southerly 
direction just east of and into defendant's house. (Tr. 65, 
135. ) The defendant's house is situated on the north side 
of the road. ( Tr. 102.) 
On the morning of the 9th day of January, 1948, the 
defendant left his house at Youngward, Utah, at about 
7:20 a. m., driving his automobile. He drove generally in 
an easterly direction toward his intended destination of 
Avon and Paradise, eventually travelling on the College 
"Vard-.Millville Road. He was travelling at the rate of 
about 25 miles per hour and in his lane of traffic on the 
south portion of the road. (Tr. 61, 89.) The night before, 
it rained, and having froze during the night and the roads 
were icy and slippery. This fact was known to both the 
plaintiff and defendant. (Tr. 63, 133.) 
When the plaintiff reached a point about 300 feet 
;r. west of the defendant's house, he saw a school bus, which 
ltd defendant was driving, emerging in a backward, south-
t~ erly direction from the east side of his house along his 
ih1 private driveway. ( Tr. 64, 66, 89.) At this point, he took 
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his foot off the accelerator and the speed of his automobile 
decrease to about 20 miles per hour. As he went over a 
culvert, the bus was · somewhere between defendant's 
fence line and the north shoulder of the road. The cul-
vert is about 229 feet west of defendant's house. (Tr. 64, 
65, 136.) He continued to watch the school bus, thinking 
it would stop, he thought this until he reached a point 
about half way between the culvert and defendant's 
house, or about 115 feet away, when he decided that it 
was not going to. When confronted with this situation, 
the plaintiff applied his brakes but couldn't stop because 
of the slippery condition of the road. The defendant~ in-
stead of stopping and yielding the right-of-way as plain-
tiff had a right to expect and did expect, continued to back 
the school bus south-easterly across the road until the 
rear wheels of the school bus were about 2 feet off the 
south line of the hard surface of the highway, blocking 
the road. (Tr. 6S, 66, 88, 93, 96.) The school bus was 29.0 
feet long, 8 fe~t wide and weighed 12,000 pounds. (Tr. 
90, 111.) 
The plaintiff atempted to avoid a collision by apply-
ing his brakes and turning to the north side of the road, 
thinking that the defendant would stop and permit him 
to pass. As he did so, the defendant started the school 
bus in a forward position, and just as the rear left wheel 
of the bus cleared the center of the road to the north about 
2 feet, the collision occurred. The plaintiff's automobile 
was about straddle the center of the road. ( Tr. 66, 98.99.) 
In explaining his attempt to avoid the collision, the 
plaintiff testified: (A) .. As I was watching his bus, I saw 
him backing out on the road, bnt I had no idea he was 
I 
r 
I 
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coming out across the highway until I got down about half 
wa~· between the culvert and his dri\'eway when he came 
out, and I tried to stop but it couldn't be done. As he 
backed out, there was a telephone or electric light pole on 
the south side of the road, and there was no chance for me 
to go between the pole and the rear end, and I coudn"t get 
between the fence and the pole, and his being in the pos-
ition he was, I figured I could get in front of him, but just 
as I turned my car to go, he pulled up in front of me. I 
then turned my car back on the ice." (Tr. 65,66.) 
The defendant neither gave a signal that he was go-
ing to back across the road nor did he sound his horn nor 
give any warning that he intended to do so. ( Tr. 66.) 
Since the damage and injuries are not in question~ 
we will not detail them. here. 
In considering this appeal, we must take the evidence 
most favorable to the appellant. 
GROESBECK V. LAKESIDE PRINTING CO. 
55 Utah 335, 186 P. 10.3. 
ROACH V. RAILROAD CO., 
69 Utah 530, 256 P. 1061. 
:\ liLLER V. WHITE, 
70 Utah 145- 258 P. 565. 
BARLOW V. UTAH LIGHT & TRACTION CO., 
77 Utah 556, 298 P. 386. 
RICKS V. BUDGE, 
91 Utah 307, 64 P. ( 2d) 208. 
HEDDEN V. TOWN OF BINGHAM CANYON, 
94 Utah 442, 78 P. ( 2d) 637. 
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UHR V. EATON, 
95 Utah 309, 80 P. (2d) 925. 
LEE V. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO., 
95 Utah 445, 82 P. (2d) 178. 
GRAHAr..t V. JOHNSON, et. al. 
166 P. (2d) 230 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant 
made a motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that 
the plaintiff had failed to show any negligence on the 
part of the defendant as alleged in his complaint: ( 1) 
That he failed to keep a proper lookout. ( 2) That he 
failed and admitted to have his automobile under control. 
( 3) That he failed to yield the right-of-way. ( 4) That 
he failed to give a signal or warning of his intention to 
back into the highway. ( 5) That such were not the ap-
proximate cause of plaintiff's damage and injuries. ( Tr. 
166, 170.) 
The Court held that in-as-much as the plaintiff was 
travelling 25 miles an hour when 300 feet from the point 
of impact, that he was contributory negligent as a matter 
of law. (Tr. 172) 
Thereafter, the motion for a new trial was denied. 
(Tr. 41.) 
ASSIGN~IENTS OF ERROR 
Errors committed by the trial court upon which ap-
pellant relies for a reversal of the judgment: 
1. That the court erred in gtanting defendant's mo-
tion for a directed verdict in favor of said defendant and 
, 
r 
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in entering judgment thereon. 
2. The court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for 
a new trial. 
ARGU~IENT 
RIGHT OF WAY 
We will not repeat the evidence as disclosed in the 
statement of fact except as it is necessary to point out the 
law applicable thereto. 
The defendant, notwithstanding that he knew that 
the roads the morning of the accident were in an icy and 
slippery condition, proceeded to back his 29~ foot school 
bus south-easterly across the road from his driveway until 
it blocked the road to traffic travelling in either direction. 
He did not, as would be expected of him by a driver com-
ing from the west, back into the north lane, but contin-
ued without warning or signal to completely cross the 
road, until the rear wheels were off the south side of the 
hard surface of the road, and this he commenced to do 
when the plaintiff was only about 110 to 120 feet away. 
In contrast to this, the plaintiff, in the meantime, as 
he proceeded down the road, kept a lookout, first seeing 
the defenda!lt when about 300 feet away, at which time 
he let up on the accelerator and the speed of his automo-
bile was reduced to about 20 miles an hour. He contin-
ued to watch the defendant, always expecting that the 
defendant would stop and yield him the right-of-way. 
The first notice he had, however, that the defendant was 
not going to do so was when he was about 120 feet away 
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from defendant's driveway. He then applied his brakes 
and attempted to stop. He could not do so, however, 
because of the condition of the road. In the meantime, 
defendant pulled nearly across the road and then started 
forward again. Plaintiff, however, at this point, attempt-
eJ to avoid the accident by driving in front of the defend-
ant. However, instead of defendant permitting him to 
proceed in front of him, he pulled forward again and the 
collision occurred just north of the center of the road. 
Under these facts and conditions, question of whether 
the defendant was negligent or not was a question for 
the jury. 
The Court had before it 57-7-139 U.C.A. l!J43, which 
provides: 
The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a 
highway from a 1Jrir;ate road or driveway shall 
yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approach-
ing on said highway. '-' 
This section has not been construed by this court. 
However, similar statutes of other states have been inter-
preted and they have uniformly held that in the curcum-
stnces similar to the one in question, the question of 
whether a driver of a vehicle emerging from a driveway 
into a pub1ic street was negligent in so doing was one for 
the jury. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of Salt-
ers vs. Uhler 292 N. w: 762, reversed the decision of the 
trial court, 'which directed verdict against the plaintiff 
under the following facts. The plaintiff's evidence shows 
that as he travelled down the highway at about 30 to 35 
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miles an hour, he first noticed the defendant's vehicle 
parked in a private driveway about 600 feet away. That 
when 300 feet from the driveway, he turned toward the 
center of the road. He was then going approximately 31 
miles an hour. At about 250 feet from the driveway, the 
bus started to leave the driveway at from 3 to 6 miles an 
hour. The plaintiff continued to drive in the center of 
the road with the idea of permitting defendant to stop 
on the shoulder. When the front wheels of the defend-
ants vehicle reached the top of the incline, he was about 
150 feet away; that he was 75 feet away when defendant 
reached the north edge of the pavement and going 25 
miles an hour. 
The defendant continued, however, and the collis-
ion occurred. 
The Court said: 
This state111ent is relevant he1'e as a reasonable 
man plaintiff was entitled to assume that defend-
ant would yield the right-of-way, at least until 
a reasonable basis to the contrary appeared.L If 
this were not so, the right-of-way would be of 
little value and ordinary traffic on the highway 
bottlenecked at every private driveway on which 
a vehicle wa.~· approaching the main thorough-
fare. Defendant owed the right-of-way, and on 
the present record clearly violated it. Precisely 
at what point plaintiff should have appreciated 
that his right-of-way would be violated need not 
be resolved now 0 0 o until a reasonable ground ap-
pearn! to make plaintiff appreciate that defend-
ant was going to enter the highway irrespective 
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of plaintiffs presence, he had a right to assume 
that due care would be exercised. It was for the 
jury to decide whether plaintiff apprehended the 
risk seasonable and the1'eafter conducted him-
self as a 1'easonable man. 
In Keller vs. !\laricopa Tractor Company, et al, 123 
P ( 2d) 166, the Arizona Court said: 
Kehncke testified that he saw plaintiff approach-
ing 15 feet before the front of his truck reached 
the paved slab. He thus had warning that he 
was endeavoring to cross the pathway of an ap-
proaching vehicle which had the right-of way. 
We think that under such circumstances it was 
his duty not to attempt the crossing unless, as a 
reasonable prudent man, he had a right to be-
lieve he could complete it before the motorcycle 
reached him. He did not look to see how far 
away the motorcycle was just before the truck 
entered the paved highway, but did look when 
its front had reached the center of the road. 
Even taking his own testimony as to his speed in 
the light most favorable to him, it is evident that 
when the front wheels of the truck were at the 
edge of the pavement the motorcycle could have 
been more than 600 feet away, which agrees 
with plaintiff's teastimony on this point. Con-
sidering the length of the truck and trailer and 
the slow speed at which it could travel, can we 
say a jury could not legally have found it was 
negligent for him not to look for and observe the 
posit.;on of the motorcvcle immediatelv before 
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he entered the pavement, and seeing it at not 
over 600 feet distance,not to wait till it had 
passed. 
The District Court of Appeals of California in the 
case of .\lcDougall vs. :\lon-ison, 130 P ( 2d) 149, held 
that where a vehicle stops at the edge of a road before 
entering the highway and saw a vehicle 500 feet away, 
that whether or not he was negligent in entering the high-
way and driving into the· highway was a question for the 
jury. 
The h"tle rule is that, under the section· of the 
Vehicle Code above quoted, it is made the duty 
of the driver of an automobile entering the high-
way from a private drive to look for approaching 
cars, and not to proceed if one is coming, unless, 
as a reasonably prudent and cautious person he 
believes, and has a right to believe, that he can 
pass in front of the other in safety. Wakefield 
v. Horn, 109 Cal. App. 325, 293 P. 97; see, also 
Conley v. i\!Iarvin, 210 Cal. 330, 291, P. 830; see 
cases collected 5,Am. Jur. p. 670, & 306; Hender-
son v. O'Leary, 177 Wis. 130, 187 N.W. 994, 24 
A.L.R. 946. 
Each case must turn upon its own facts. Con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law, can only 
be found where reasonable minds cannot but 
conclude that a reasonably careful and pruJent 
person situated as was plaintiff would not have · 
acted as he did. The situations where a court 
will so declare are rare. Casselman v. Hartford 
Ace, & I. Co., 36 Cal. App. 2d. 700 98 P. 539; 
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Enz v. Johns, 112 Cal. App. 1, 296 P. 11.5. If 
the evidence is in conflict, the finding of the 
trier of the facts is conclusive. 
See Parker etal vs. Brooks, 300 N.W. 400. Kosher 
vs. Kocker, etal, 4 N.W. 2d 158, Nix vs. Wodworth, etal, 
53 P. 2d 765. 
The defendant in driving was required to exercise 
care and caution commencerate with the occasion. Un-
der the statute, he was required not to enter the highway 
until under the circumstances he conld do so with reason-
able certainty that he could do so with safety. Whether 
he did or not was a question for the jury to decide. 
SPEED 
The Court said that the plaintiff was negligent in this 
matter of law because of excessive speed. In this re-
spect, the evidence showed that at the time and place in 
question, that he was travelling about 25 miles an hour; 
that upon seeing defendant's bus emerging from the side 
of his- house that he took his foot off the accelerator and 
slowed down, and that accordingly in the distance of 
about 50 feet his automobile slowed down to 20 miles an 
hour; that he continued thus to slow down and that he 
only applied his brakes when the defendant pulled his 
bus across the road in front of him. The defendant cre-
ated an emergency. The plaintiff used the best judgment 
he had under the circumstances. 'iVhether he should 
have applied his brakes was a question for the jury. He 
did all in his power to avoid the accident. What more 
he could have done does not appear. The plaintiff con-
cedes that although the maximum speed limit allowed 
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here was 60 miles an hour that he could not travel at such 
a rate but that he was compelled to drive at a speed not 
greater than would be reasonable and pntdent under the 
conditions having regard for the actual and potential con-
ditions existing on the highway. That whether the rate 
of ~peed that plaintiff was driving at that time of day in 
question was negligence we believe was a question for 
the jury. 
In the case of Humphreys vs. Complete Auto Transit 
Inc., etal, 9 N. W. 2d 55, the Supreme Court of Michigan 
said that where the plaintiff was driving at the rate of 25 
to 40 miles an hour on icy roads was a question for the 
jury. The defendant moved for a directed verdict. The 
motion was denied and the case submitted to the jury. 
From a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant ap-
pealed. 
The Court said: 
In the case at bar, there was testimony that the 
defendant had driven over this highway on num-
et'D1lS occassions and on all kinds of weather con-
ditions. On the day of the accident, the pavement 
was generally icy. The defendant could see an 
object the size of an automobile at a distance of 
700 feet, yet he did not see plaintiff's car before 
the impact. II e was travelling at the rate of ft·om 
25 to 40 miles per hour. He knew of the decline 
in the pavement but he did nothing to reduce his 
speed. Considering all the circumstances, we 
are of the opinion that reasonable minds might 
differ as to whether defendant's driver was neg-
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ligent. The question was therefore one for the 
fury. 
In the case of Eisenhower, etal, vs. Halls ~fotor Tran-
sit Company, etal,40 Atl. 2d, 458, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that where a truck and trailer was 
loaded and driving at from 20 to 30 miles an hour on a 
downward slope, and in so doing failed to negotiate the 
turn and skidded into a tree, that whether such was neg-
ligence was a question for the jury. 
The Court said: 
According to what may be a permissable rate 
of speed at one time and place and under given 
circumstances, may be wholly i-mproper on other 
on other occasions and different circumstances, 
and in cases where unusual conditions that exist, 
it has been held that the question as to speed was 
for the jury. 
See: Rr~ssel vs. Berger, 30 N. E. 2nd, 642. 
CO~\'CLUSIO~ 
Decision of the tr.i:1l court should not be permitted 
to stand, it should be reversed. To hold that a driver of 
a vehicle because he drives on slippery roads of 25 miles 
an hour, is negligent as a matter of law ignores all the 
facts cognizant with every day driving. Furthermore, 
to permit a driver of a vehicle emerging from a private 
driveway into a public way to do so when a vehicle is ap-
proaching within the distance the facts in the case dis-
close, is to defeat the very purpose for which the statHte 
was passed. In, this case, the defendant knew of the 
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conditions of the road. He started from a stopped pos-
ition, thus having control over the situation in all of its 
aspect. Nevertheless he elected to proceed onto the high-
way knowing, or he should have known, that to do so 
would likely involve the school bus he was driving and the 
plaintiff's vehicle in a collision. To say the least, the 
questions to be resolved here are one for the jury and the 
trial court in directing a verdict for the defendant in-
vaded the jnrys province. 
We respectfully ask that the decision be reversed and 
that a new trial be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEWELL G. DAINES 
L. DELOS DAINES, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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